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SUMMARY
Some governmental leaders, scientists and media outlets have claimed that cli-
mate change is the world’s most important environmental problem, and unless we 
drastically reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) now, climate change will make our 
descendants worse off than we are. However, if one adjusts the IPCC’s estimates 
of future welfare per capita in the absence of climate change (as measured by the 
GDP per capita) downward per the Stern Review’s 95th percentile estimate of the 
costs of unbridled climate change, then at least through 2200 our descendants 
should be much better off than we are. These costs of climate change include those 
due to market impacts, non-market (i.e., environmental and public heath) impacts, 
and the risk of catastrophe.
Mortality estimates for the year 2000 from the World Health Organization (WHO) 
also indicate that a dozen other environmental, food and nutritional risk factors 
(e.g., hunger, malaria, unsafe water, and indoor and outdoor air pollution) contribute 
more to global mortality and burden of disease than climate change. Moreover, the 
state-of-the-art fast track assessments (FTAs) – sponsored by the British Govern-
ment – of the global impacts of climate change show that through 2085-200, 
climate change would (a) contribute less to mortality than other risk factors, (b) 
reduce the net global population at risk of water stress, and (c) and increase habitat 
converted to cropland thereby increasing threats to biodiversity. Climate change is, 
therefore, not this century’s most important environmental problem. 
The FTA results also indicate that rolling climate change back to 990 levels would 
reduce cumulative mortality from hunger, malaria, and coastal flooding by 4–0 
percent in 2085, while the Kyoto Protocol would lower it by 0.4– percent. By con-
trast, adaptive measures focused specifically on reducing vulnerability to climate 
sensitive threats (e.g., hunger, malaria, and flooding) would reduce cumulative 
mortality by 50–75 percent at a fraction of the Kyoto Protocol’s cost.
But these climate sensitive threats are also major hurdles to the developing world’s 
sustainable economic development, which is the major reason for its vulnerabili-
ty to climate change (and any other form of adversity). Thus, focused adaptation 
would, in addition to specifically combating climate change, advance sustainable 
development and well-being more effectively than aggressive GHG reductions, 
particularly of the world’s most vulnerable populations. 
Alternatively, the benefits of focused adaptation – and more (e.g., reductions in 
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poverty, and infant and maternal mortality by 50-75 %; increased access to safe 
water and sanitation; and universal literacy) — can be obtained by broadly advan-
cing sustainable economic development through policies, institutions and measures 
(such as those that would meet the UN Millennium Development Goals) at a cost 
approximating that of the Kyoto Protocol.
Accordingly, to effectively address climate change while simultaneously advancing 
human well-being, this paper recommends combining focused adaptation and broad 
pursuit of sustainable economic development with no-regret mitigation policies. 
To deal with climate change beyond the 2085-200 timeframe, this paper also re-
commends expanding research and development of mitigation options, reducing 
barriers to implementing such options, and active science and monitoring programs 
to provide early warning of any “dangerous” climate change impacts. 
. INTRODUCTION
In the past several years some scientists, media outlets, and, more importantly, emi-
nent policy makers ranging from Presidents Clinton and Chirac to Prime Minister 
Blair have asserted that climate change is the most important environmental pro-
blem facing the globe, and unless we drastically reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
now, climate change will make our descendants worse off than we are (Clinton 999; 
Cordis News 2004). In fact, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon recently declared 
that climate change is “the defining challenge of our age” (Rosenthal 2007).
These claims – always offered without proof – can be tested.  
First, I will examine whether our descendants’ well-being will indeed be lower than 
ours (Section 2). I will answer this question by comparing current welfare per capita 
against future welfare per capita after adjusting it downward to account for wel-
fare losses due to climate change. For these downward adjustments, I will use the 
Stern Review’s upper bound estimates of the loss of human welfare from market 
impacts, non-market (i.e., environmental and public health) impacts and the risk 
of catastrophe due to unmitigated climate change. I will show that although the 
Review’s estimates are substantially overblown, even they indicate that through 
2200 at least, future generations would be much better off than present ones even 
if climate change is not mitigated.
Second, I will examine whether climate change is, indeed, the most pressing envi-
ronmental and human health problem that the world faces this century (Section 
3). In order to accomplish this, I will examine the impacts of climate change in the 
wider context of other factors contributing to similar impacts. Specifically, I will 
compare whether the contribution of climate change to various critical climate-
sensitive risks to human and environmental well-being exceeds the contributions 
due to non-climate-change-related risks currently (Section 3.) and in the foresee-
able future (Section 3.2). It is possible to make such comparisons because climate 
change, for the most part, does not create new problems, rather it exacerbates 
existing problems such as increases in hunger, vector-borne diseases (e.g., malaria), 
water shortages, coastal flooding, and threats to species and biodiversity. 
With respect to human well-being, I will examine the contribution of climate 
change to mortality from a variety of environmental, food and nutrition-related 
risk factors including hunger, malaria (which is responsible for about 75 percent 
of the global burden of disease from vector-borne diseases; IPCC 200a: 463), 
and coastal flooding; and the population at risk for water stress. With respect to 
environmental well-being, I will examine the future (projected) global effect of 
climate change on net biome productivity, habitat lost to cropland, and the extent 
of coastal wetlands.   
I will use these results regarding the future contribution of climate change to va-
rious indicators of human and environmental well-being to compare, through the 
foreseeable future, the human and environmental costs and benefits of mitigation 
policies that would restrict GHGs against adaptation policies that would make so-
ciety less vulnerable or more resilient to climate-sensitive risks (Section 4). Based 
on these estimates, I will offer policies for addressing climate change risks in the 
context of other, perhaps more urgent, risks to human and environmental well-
being (Section 5), before concluding (Section 6).
Before launching on the analysis, I will discuss the sources of information used in 
the analyses employed in this paper.   
Information sources used in this paper
Because of the politicized nature of the climate change debate, it is critical to note 
that the underlying information used in this paper’s analysis has been generated 
by groups and individuals who are highly supportive of swift and drastic action 
on climate change. 
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First, estimates of the loss of future welfare due to climate change are taken from 
the Stern Review (2006), despite its tendency to overestimate the costs of climate 
change (Byatt et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2006; Dasgupta, 2006; Nordhaus, 2006; 
Tol and Yohe, 2006; Tol 2007a). 
Second, for information on climate change impacts through the foreseeable fu-
ture, I will use Goklany’s (2007a) compilation of peer reviewed results of the Fast 
Track Assessments (FTAs) of the global impacts of climate change sponsored by 
the British Government (Parry 2004; Arnell et al 2002; Arnell 2004; Nicholls 2004; 
Parry and Livermore 999). Many, if not most, of the FTAs’ authors are also major 
contributors to the IPCC’s impacts assessments. Unsurprisingly, FTA results are ci-
ted frequently within those assessments. 
Figure  shows the GDP per capita for 990 (the base year) and 200 per the four 
major IPCC (2000) emission scenarios used by the FTAs and the Stern Review. For 
200, the scenarios (bars) are arranged in order of the descending amount of cli-
mate change as measured by changes in the average global temperature from 
990 to 2085 (i.e., ∆T), with the warmest scenario (AFI) on the left and the coo-
lest (B) on the right.2
This Figure shows that in the absence of climate change, countries — particularly 
developing countries — will be much wealthier in the future than they are current-
ly. For instance, under the warmest (AFI) scenario, mean welfare per capita in the 
absence of climate change would increase seventy-fold for developing countries, 
from $900 in 990 to $66,500 in 200. For industrialized countries welfare per 
capita would increase seven-fold over the same period, from $3,700 to $07,300. 
[All figures are in real 990 US dollars.] For context, in 2006, GDP per capita for 
industrialized countries was $9,300; the US, $30,00; and developing countries, 
$,500 (all in 990 US$).  Thus, in the future, today’s developing countries would 
be much better off than today’s industrialized countries, and the former’s adap-
tive capacity should be that much higher. However, although the higher levels of 
economic growth are fully considered in estimating future GHG emissions, the re-
 I will assume that the foreseeable future extends to 2085-200.  This may be overly-optimistic 
because the emission scenarios are driven by socioeconomic assumptions and projections that 
are highly speculative. In fact, according to a paper commissioned for the Stern Review, socio-
economic factors “cannot be projected semi-realistically for more than 5–0 years at a time” 
(Lorenzini and Adger 2006: 74).
2 The “FI” in “AFI” indicates that this scenario is fossil fuel intensive. GDP/capita is in 990 U.S. 
dollars, and the global temperature change is based on the HadCM3 model.
sulting increases in adaptive capacity are, at best, only partially accounted for by 
the methodologies used to estimate future impacts. Thus the impacts estimates 
of the FTAs and the Stern Review are internally inconsistent with the fundamental 
assumptions embedded in the IPCC emissions scenarios which drive estimates of 
future climate change that are then used to project future impacts.
In addition, the impact estimates made by the FTAs and the Stern Review (which 
itself refers extensively to the FTAs) generally ignore advances in secular techno-
logy that would occur after the 990s. This is akin to projecting in 900 agricu-
ltural production for 2000 based on the assumption that agricultural technology 
will not change in the interim. 
Figure 1:  Mean welfare per capita in the absence of climate change in 1990 
and 2100 for developing and industrialized countries, measured as 
GDP per capita (in 1990 US$) per the IPCC scenarios, and associated 
increases in global temperature from 1990 to 2085 (∆T). 
Sources: Arnell et al. (2004), IPCC (2000).
1
67
11
18
40 
14
107 
46
54
73
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Actual A C
1990 2100
$S
U
  
 
f
o
 sd na suoh t
Developing
Industrialized
C
10	 Addressing	Climate	Change	in	the	Context	of	Other	Problems	A	Plea	for	Realism	over	Ideology 	 Addressing	Climate	Change	in	the	Context	of	Other	Problems	A	Plea	for	Realism	over	Ideology	 
Thus, both the Stern Review and the FTAs systematically overestimate climate 
change impacts because they do not account fully for increases in adaptive ca-
pacity resulting either from the higher wealth built into the IPCC emission and 
climate change scenarios or advances in technology that ought to occur over the 
decades (Goklany 2005, 2007a; Tol 2005). Nevertheless, for this study I will take 
their results at face value because the results are peer reviewed and/or have played 
an important part in the international debate on global warming, and have been 
cited extensively by the IPCC’s Assessments and the UK Government-sponsored 
Symposium on Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change during the run-up to the G8’s 
2005 Gleneagles Summit (DEFRA 2005).  
Like the FTA, this paper doesn’t consider low-probability but potentially high-con-
sequence outcomes (e.g., shutdown of the thermohaline circulation, or melting of 
the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets). They are deemed unlikely to occur during 
this century, if at all (IPCC 2007: 7).
Finally, I will rely on the World Health Organization (2002) for estimates of mor-
tality due to various food, nutritional and environmental risks, many of which are 
climate-sensitive; IPCC (200b) for costs of the Kyoto Protocol; and the UN Millen-
nium Project (2005a, b, c) for costs of reducing malaria, hunger, and other risks and 
hurdles to sustainable development faced by developing countries, in particular. 
2. WILL CLIMATE CHANGE LEAVE OUR 
DESCENDANTS WORSE-OFF?
Figure  showed that per the IPCC scenarios, our descendants should be much bet-
ter off than us if one does not account for potential losses due to climate chan-
ge. But would that hold true if one factors in estimates of welfare losses due to 
climate change? 
Figure 2 shows, for 2050 through 2200, the Stern Review’s estimates of the annu-
al undiscounted stream of losses in equivalent GDP per capita (“income”) due to 
unmitigated climate change under the Review’s “high climate change” scenario. 
This scenario is equivalent to the IPCC’s warmest scenario (i.e., AFI). The estimates 
shown here include losses due to market impacts, non-market (i.e., environmental 
and public health) impacts, and the risk of catastrophe. It shows that the mean 
loss in welfare due to climate change rises from relatively small amounts in the 
early years to 2.9 percent in 200, with the 5th–95th percentile estimates of losses 
in 200 ranging from 0.9–7.5 percent. By 2200, equivalent losses may range from 
2.9–35.2 percent, with a mean loss of 3.8 percent.  
Figure 3 shows the net welfare per capita in 200 and 2200, respectively, for both 
developing and industrialized countries after adjusting welfare per capita (i.e., GDP 
per capita) downward to account for unmitigated climate change, assuming that 
welfare loss is equivalent to the Stern Review’s 95th percentile estimates. As in-
dicated in Figure 2, for the AFI scenario this would be a reduction of 7.5 percent 
in 200 and 35.2 percent in 2200. For the other scenarios, I assume that climate 
change losses would increase with the square of the average global temperature 
increase from 990 to 2085 (indicated in Figure ).3
Figure 3 also assumes that if climate were not to change, GDP per capita would 
double between 200 and 2200, that is, GDP per capita would increase by 0.7 per-
cent per year during that period. By contrast, the Stern Review assumes a long run 
(200–2200) growth rate of .3 percent per year (Stern Review, Box 6.3).  Moreover, 
the doubling assumption may be conservative in light of historical experience: GDP 
per capita quintupled between 900 and 2000 (Maddison 2003). Thus, welfare per 
capita in 2200 may be underestimated.  
These assumptions on top of the fact that the Review doesn’t fully account for fu-
ture increases in adaptive capacity that should occur under each scenario due to 
greater wealth and secular advances in technology means that Figure 3 severely 
underestimates future welfare per capita after climate change. 
Note that no discount rate was applied in developing the net welfare estimates 
in Tables 2 and 3.
Nevertheless, despite the piling on of “conservative” assumptions, Figure 3 indi-
3 Most integrated assessment models – Nordhaus’ RICE/DICE, Manne et al’s MERGE and Tol’s 
FUND – assume that the impacts of climate change increase linearly or with the square of global 
temperature increases while Hope’s PAGE assumes that impact functions (I) take the form of a 
polynomial such that I = constant x Tn, where n is a variable whose minimum, most likely and 
maximum values are , .3 and 3 respectively (Warren et al., 2006b). The qualitative results and 
conclusions derived from Figure 3 would be unchanged had I assumed that welfare losses due 
to climate change for all IPCC scenarios would either be at the same level as for the warmest 
scenario or would vary with the cube of the temperature increase.
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cates that under each of the IPCC scenarios, net welfare per capita in 200 and 
2200 will be several-fold higher than in 990 for both industrialized and develo-
ping countries, regardless of any climate change. 
Figure 3 illustrates that welfare per capita in today’s developing countries should 
be higher in 2200 than it was in industrialized countries in 990 under all sce-
narios even after accounting for unmitigated climate change. That is, regardless 
of any climate change, populations living within the borders of today’s developing 
countries will in the future be better off than people currently inhabiting today’s 
industrialized countries. This is also true for 200 for all but the poorest (A2) sce-
nario. Thus the claim that unmitigated climate change will make future generations 
worse off than current ones is not justified, and cannot, therefore, be employed as 
an argument for taking drastic measures to control GHG emissions now.  Nor can it 
be employed to use a low discount rate in cost benefit analysis of climate change 
policies even if costs and benefits span different generations.
Figure 3 also shows that:
• Under each scenario, for both developing and industrialized countries, net wel-
fare should be higher in 200 than it was in 990, and higher in 2200 than in 
200. This suggests that Solow’s (993) criterion for sustainable development 
– namely, that current generations should “endow [future generations] with 
whatever it takes to achieve a standard of living at least as good as our own” 
– would be easily met. 
• Net welfare in both 200 and 2200 is highest under the richest-but-warmest 
(AFI) scenario, and lowest under the poorest (A2) scenario. In fact, in 200, 
under both the B and AFI scenarios, net welfare per capita of the inhabi-
tants of the currently developing countries will exceed that for the US in 2006 
($30,00), to be joined in 2200 by the B2 scenario. Therefore to the extent 
society wants to undertake policies that would favor one scenario over another, 
Figure 2:  Losses in income per capita due to unmitigated climate change through 
2200 due to market impacts, non-market impacts, and the risk of 
catastrophe based on the “high climate change” scenario. The range 
of estimates from the 5th to the 95th percentile is shaded grey. 
Source: Stern Review, Figure 6.5c. 
Figure 3:  Net welfare per capita, 1990-2200, after accounting for losses due 
to unmitigated climate change, per the Stern Review‘s 95th percentile 
estimates. Note that no discounting is used to estimate net welfare. 
For context, in 2006, GDP per capita (unadjusted for any climate 
change) for industrialized countries was $19,300; the US, $30,100; 
and developing countries, $1,500 (all in 1990 US$).
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it should favor policies that would result in the highest level of wealth rather 
than the one with the lowest CO2 level.
3. IS CLIMATE CHANGE THE WORLD’S MOST 
IMPORTANT ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM?
3.1 The Present
A review paper in Nature attributes 66,000 deaths worldwide in 2000 to climate 
change (Patz et al. 2005). This estimate is based on analysis published under WHO 
auspices but whose authors acknowledge that
 climate change occurs against a background of substantial natural climate 
variability, and its health effects are confounded by simultaneous changes 
in many other influences on population health... Empirical observation of 
the health consequences of long-term climate change, followed by formu-
lation, testing and then modification of hypotheses would therefore require 
long time-series (probably several decades) of careful monitoring. While 
this process may accord with the canons of empirical science, it would not 
provide the timely information needed to inform current policy decisions on 
GHG emission abatement, so as to offset possible health consequences in 
the future. [(McMichael et al. 2004: 546), emphasis added.]  
Even if one eschews skepticism regarding this estimate (since science was ad-
mittedly sacrificed in pursuit of predetermined policy objectives), this amounts to 
0.3 percent of the 55.8 million global death toll (WHO 2002). In fact, as shown in 
Table , climate change is outranked by at least a dozen other health risk factors 
related to food, nutrition, environment and occupational exposure, whether based 
on global mortality or global burden of disease (using disability-adjusted life years, 
DALYs, lost due to a given disease). See Table .4
4 This table assumes 54,000 deaths attributable to climate change per WHO (2002), rather than 
66,000.  Whichever estimate is employed, the ranking of climate change wouldn’t change.
Table 1: Priority Ranking of Food, Nutrition and Environmental Risk Factors 
Based on Lost DALYs for 2000
  Ranking Attributable mortality DALYs Lost
people (in 
thousand)
(%)
people (in 
thousand)
(%)
Underweight (insufficient food)  3,748 6.7% 37,80 9.5%
Blood pressure (unhealthy foods) 2 7,4 2.8% 64,270 4.4%
Unsafe water, sanitation and hygiene 3 ,730 3.% 54,58 3.7%
Malaria (see NOTE, below) ,2 2.0% 42,080 2. 9%
Cholesterol (unhealthy foods) 4 4,45 7.9% 40,437 2.8%
Indoor smoke from solid fuels 5 ,69 2.9% 38,539 2.7%
Iron deficiency (malnutrition) 6 84 .5% 35,057 2.4%
Overweight (unhealthy or too much food) 7 2,59 4.6% 33,45 2.3%
Zinc deficiency (malnutrition) 8 789 .4% 28,034 .9%
Low fruit and vegetable intake 9 2,726 4.9% 26,662 .3%
Vitamin A deficiency (malnutrition) 0 778 .4% 26,638 .8%
Lead exposure (environmental)  234 0.4% 2,926 0.9%
Urban air pollution (environmental) 2 799 .4% 7,865 0.5%
Climate change (environmental) 
(See NOTE below) 3 54 0.3% 5,57 0.48%
SUBTOTAL (see NOTE, below) 27,566 49.42% 511,319  35.2%
TOTAL IN 2000 FROM ALL CAUSES 55,776 1,453,617
NOTES:  Except for malaria, the deaths (and lost DALYs) for the various risk factors listed 
in the table are calculated by reassigning deaths (and lost DALYs) from immediate causes 
of death to the above listed risk factors. Under this approach, deaths and lost DALYs due to 
malaria were redistributed into the totals for underweight, zinc and Vitamin A deficiencies, 
and climate change. Because of that, malaria is, by itself, unranked, and the SUBTOTAL does 
not include the numbers for malaria. By itself malaria would have been ranked 4th(based on 
lost DALYs) or 8th (based on mortality).
Source:  Goklany (2007b: 355-356), derived from World Health Report 2002, Annexes 2, 3, , 2, 
4-6.
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Climate change is outranked by more mundane, but deadlier, problems, e.g., ma-
laria (.2 million deaths); underweight (3.24 million deaths)5; unsafe water, in-
adequate sanitation, and hygiene (.73 million deaths); indoor air pollution from 
indoor heating and cooking with wood, coal, and dung (.62 million deaths); va-
rious micronutrient deficiencies (2.4 million deaths); insufficient fruit and vege-
table intake (2.7 million deaths); urban air pollution (0.8 million deaths); and lead 
exposure (0.23 million deaths).
So climate change is clearly not today’s most important environmental or public 
health problem. However, would its future impacts outweigh that of other fac-
tors?
3.2 The Foreseeable Future
To illuminate this issue, for public health-related impacts, I will use Goklany’s 
(2007a) compilation of FTA results for global populations at risk (PARs) in 2085 for 
hunger, malaria, coastal flooding, and water resources (from Parry et al. 2004; Arnell 
et al. 2002; Martens et al. 999; Nicholls 2004; Arnell 2004). I will then convert 
the PARs for hunger, malaria [which accounts for 75 percent of the global burden 
of the main vector-borne diseases, IPCC (200a: 463, Table 9-)], and coastal floo-
ding into annual mortality assuming that mortality scales linearly with PAR, and 
that mortality for these threats between 990 and 200 is unchanged.6 
Because the PAR for malaria (from Arnell et al. 2002) used an older “business-as-
usual” IPCC scenario (IS92a) which also assumed no mitigation whatsoever and a 
990-2085 global temperature rise of 3.2°C, additional assumptions are necessary 
5 This estimate excludes an estimated 0.5 million people who died from malaria but whose 
deaths were attributed to underweight in the report (WHO 2002).
6 This assumption is necessary because mortality data for hunger and malaria are not readily 
available for 990. The number of people suffering from chronic undernourishment in the 
developing countries was virtually unchanged from 990–992 and 2000–2002 (824 million 
versus 85 million; FAO 2004). Malaria killed 2 million in 993 and .2 million in 200 (WHO 
995, 2002). I will use the latter figure for 990. Finally, there were 7,00 fatalities due to 
floods, windstorms and waves/surges in 990 and an average of 7,500 for 2000–2004 (exclud-
ing deaths due to the 2004 Christmas tsunami) (EM-DAT 2005).  Nevertheless, I assume 8,000 
deaths in 990 due to coastal flooding alone. Thus these calculations underestimate the rela-
tive importance of malaria, while overestimating that of coastal flooding. Both assumptions 
inflate the importance of climate change relative to other factors. But for these assumptions, 
this paper’s conclusions would be even stronger. See Footnote 9.
to derive mortality for each scenario depicted in Table . Specifically, I will assu-
me that for each scenario, PAR scales linearly with the global population in 2085, 
ceteris paribus, and that the ratio of the additional PAR due to climate change to 
PAR absent climate change varies with the square of the ratio of the global tem-
perature change.7
Mortality Estimates for Hunger, Malaria and Flooding
Figure 4 shows results for 990 and 2085 for cumulative mortality due to hunger, 
malaria, and coastal flooding without climate change, the increase in mortality due 
to climate change alone, and the sum of the two for each scenario. For simplicity, 
it shows only mortality using upper bound estimates for increases in PAR due to 
climate change, that is, Figure 4 exaggerates the relative importance of climate 
change. It shows that for each scenario, climate change’s contribution to the total 
mortality burden from malaria, hunger, and coastal flooding is small, varying from 
3.6 percent under the B scenario to 0.3 percent under the AFI (richest-but-
warmest) scenario. Thus, halting climate change at its 990 level would reduce the 
mortality burden in 2085 from these factors by no more than 0.3 percent under 
the warmest (AFI) scenario, or 237,000 deaths out of a possible 2,304,000.8
Second, in terms of both absolute numbers and the proportion of global population, 
the total mortality in 2085 from the three risk factors, hunger, malaria and floo-
ding, is highest for the poorest scenario (A2), suggesting that lack of development, 
and its spillover effects such as lower levels of human capital and technological 
prowess, are the sources of larger problems than climate change.
Notably, the methodology used to translate future PAR into mortality probably 
overestimates the latter because, as previously noted, it doesn’t allow fully for in-
creases in adaptive capacity due to both economic development and technological 
progress (or time). However, both mortality without climate change and increase 
7 The second assumption may be conservative. See Footnote 4. 
8 Had I assumed a malaria death toll of 2 million in 990 (see Footnote 7), the maximum con-
tribution of climate change to total deaths from malaria, hunger and coastal flooding would 
have been smaller, ranging from 3.% for the B2 scenario to 8.7% for the AFI scenario. Also, 
had lower estimates been used for increases in PAR due to climate change, the contribution 
of climate change would also be reduced.  For instance, using (a) low subsidence for coastal 
flooding, with delayed adaptive response and high growth in coastal areas (from Nicholls 
2004), and (b) lower bound estimates for hunger (from Parry et al. 2004), the contribution of 
climate change to mortality in 2085 for the three risk factors would be between 0.% for the 
A2 scenario to 8.5% for the AFI scenario.
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in mortality due to climate change should be overestimated to the same degree. 
Since impact analyses generally underestimate – if not totally neglect – future 
improvements in adaptive capacity, future mortality is probably overestimated for 
each scenario, with larger overestimates for wealthier scenarios.
Population at Risk of Water Stress
Figure 5 indicates the population at risk (PAR) for water stress in 2085. It indicates 
that, according to the Arnell (2004) results, climate change would reduce the net 
global PAR of water stress. This occurs because additional warming increases ave-
rage global precipitation, and although some areas may receive less precipitation, 
other, more populated areas, receive more. 
Figure 5 overestimates PAR with and without climate change since Arnell (2004) 
ignores adaptation. 
Together, Figures 4 and 5 suggest that non-climate-change-related factors should 
generally outweigh climate change with respect to public health-related aspects 
of human well-being, at least through the foreseeable future.
Figure 4.  Deaths in 2085 due to hunger, malaria and flooding, with and 
without climate change. For simplicity, only upper bound estimates 
are shown. 
Figure 5: Population at risk (PAR) from water stress in 2085, with and without 
climate change. The vertical bars indicate the populations at risk based 
on the mid-point estimates of several model runs, while the vertical 
lines indicate the range of estimates. 
Source: Goklany (2007a), based on data from Arnell (2004).
Figure 6:  Habitat converted to croplands in 2100. 
Source: Levy et al. (2004).
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Ecological Impacts
For ecological impacts, I will use Goklany’s (2007a) results based on Levy et al. 
(2004) and Nicholls (2004) for the amount of habitat diverted in 200 to cropland 
worldwide (currently the single most important threat to terrestrial biodiversity), 
net biome productivity in 200, and the loss of global coastal wetland area in 2085. 
Results are shown in Figures 6 through 8.
Figure 6 indicates that under the IPCC’s richest-but-warmest scenario, habitat 
converted to cropland would be reduced, at least through 200 (compared to 990 
levels).  That is, pressure on terrestrial species and biodiversity would be least under 
the warmest scenario. This is probably because of a combination of higher carbon 
dioxide levels, i.e., higher carbon fertilization, and greater economic development, 
i.e., greater access to technologies (Goklany 2007a, b). Both factors would lead to 
higher crop yields.9 
Figure 7:  Net biome productivity in 2100.
Source: Levy et al. (2004).
9 The original source of the data, Levy et al. (2004), did not provide results for the poorest, A2, 
scenario.
Figure 7 indicates that net biome productivity, which is also a measure of global 
carbon sink capacity, will be higher in 200 than in 990 under each scenario, in 
part because of higher atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations.
Figure 8 indicates that between 990 and 2085, the contribution of sea level rise 
(SLR) to global wetland loss will be outweighed by non-climate-change-related 
factors under all scenarios. 
Figure 8:  Average global loss of coastal wetlands in 2085, relative to 1990 
levels. The average is based on the mid-point of the high and low 
subsidence cases. Losses due to climate change and other factors are 
not additive. 
Source: Goklany (2007a), based on Nicholls (2004).
Summary
Collectively, Table , and Figures 4 through 8 indicate that while climate change 
may be important, through the foreseeable future, other problems, particularly 
lack of development, would have a much greater impact on human and environ-
mental well-being.
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4.  COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MITIGATION 
AND ADAPTATION
That non-climate-change-related factors outweigh climate change in their con-
tributions to various climate-sensitive risks has profound implications for the de-
velopment of effective approaches to reducing these risks. Compounding this is 
that, in the near-term, mitigation to reduce GHGs will have little or no impact on 
reducing the impacts of climate change due to the inertia of the climate system. 
Table 2 indicates the impact of two mitigation scenarios on mortality and habi-
tat loss for three key scenarios examined thus far, namely, AFI (the richest-and-
warmest), A2 (the poorest), and B (the coolest). [Qualitatively, results for the B2 
scenario are no different from these three.] The two mitigation scenarios represent 
the two poles at either end of the spectrum in terms of stringency, namely, the 
Kyoto Protocol at the low end of effectiveness and cost and, at the highest end, a 
“no-climate-change” scenario that would essentially roll back climate change to 
990 levels. These decreases, derived from Figures 4–8, are shown relative to the 
unmitigated case, that is, no emission controls whatsoever.
Table 2. Impact of Mitigation Policies, 2085–2100, Upper Bound Estimates
A1FI 
(richest-but-warmest)
A2 (poorest) B1 (coolest)
Kyoto 
Protocol
No 
Climate 
Change 
after 1990
Kyoto 
Protocol
No 
Climate 
Change 
after 1990
Kyoto 
Protocol
No 
Climate 
Change 
after 1990
Decline in mortality 
from malaria, hunger 
and coastal flooding 
(in thousands) in 2085
2
(%)
237
(0%)
5
(%)
282
(4%)
0
(0%)
92
(4%)
Decline in popula-
tion at risk from water 
stress (in millions) in 
2085
-83
(-5%)
-1,192
(-72%)
0 0 -44
(-2%)
-234
(-11%)
Habitat available for 
the rest of nature 
measured by extent of 
cropland in 200
Small de-
crease in 
available 
habitat
Larger 
decrease
NA NA
Small de-
crease in 
available 
habitat
Some 
decrease
Sources:  Figures 4 through 6, this paper; Goklany (2005). Notes: Figures in parentheses indicate 
percent declines in total mortality or PAR, as appropriate. Note that figures and text in 
italic indicates that mitigation makes matters worse in the future, as do the negative 
signs (for water stress). Regarding habitat (last row), estimates of future cropland in the 
absence of climate change were unavailable from the FTA, i.e., Levy et al. (2004). NA = 
not available. 
To construct this table, I optimistically assumed that by 2085 the Kyoto Protocol 
would reduce global temperature and sea level rise by 7 percent (Wigley 998), 
reducing the impacts of climate change on malaria, hunger and water stress by a 
like amount, and impacts of coastal flooding by 2 percent (Goklany 2005, 2007a, 
2007b). As will become evident, the validity of the arguments and conclusions in 
this paper hold irrespective of the precise estimates regarding the Protocol’s ef-
fectiveness. 
Table 2 demonstrates that, at least through 2085, the effects of mitigation would 
be a mixed bag – declines in mortality from malaria, hunger, and coastal flooding 
but increases in both PAR from water stress and pressures on biodiversity and 
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other species. This illustrates one of the major shortcomings of mitigation, name-
ly, mitigation is indiscriminate – it reduces all impacts, whether they are positive 
or negative. 
Table 2 also demonstrates that the Kyoto Protocol’s benefits are relatively trivial 
compared to the magnitude of outstanding problems. For example, it would redu-
ce cumulative mortality for malaria, hunger and coastal flooding by 0– percent, 
compared to 4–0 percent were climate to be somehow rolled back to its 990 
level. But even these small benefits would have significant costs. If the Kyoto Pro-
tocol were fully implemented by all signatories (including the United States), it 
would likely cost Annex  countries about $65 billion per year in 200, based on 
the lower end of the range of estimates produced by the IPCC (200b) report.0 The 
cost of the no-climate-change scenario, assuming it’s even feasible, would be far 
greater, although the literature doesn’t provide any good cost estimates for that.
4.1. Focused Adaptation
Thus, freezing climate at its 990 level would cost somewhere above $65 billion 
annually but leave untouched 90–96 percent of the mortality problem for the three 
listed threats. By contrast, focused policies that would address 00 percent of the 
mortality would improve human well-being more cost effectively. This is necessarily 
the case because cost-effective solutions to a larger portion of the problem will 
invariably include cost-effective solutions to a subset of the problem. This approach 
can be generalized beyond malaria, hunger and coastal flooding, specifically by fo-
cusing on reducing climate-sensitive threats to human and environmental welfare 
that may be exacerbated by climate change.
Moreover, policies and measures that would reduce vulnerability to the non-cli-
mate-change-related portion of the problem would also reduce the portion due to 
climate change (Goklany 2005). In particular, activities that would reduce present 
day vulnerabilities to climate-sensitive problems would also reduce similar pro-
blems in the future whether they are caused by climate change or other factors. 
For instance, a successful malaria vaccine would help reduce malaria regardless of 
whether it would be caused by climate change or something else. 
0 Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol is estimated at 0.-2.0 percent of Annex I countries’ GDP 
in 200 (IPCC 200b).  I assume 0.5 percent in 200, equivalent to $65 billion (in 2003 dollars) 
(Goklany 2005). The full range would be from $33-660 billion annually.
Such an approach – which I call “focused adaptation” – would, unlike mitigation, 
bring substantial benefits through the foreseeable future, mainly because mitigation 
would not affect the much larger share of mortality due to non-climate-change-
related factors. As shown in Table 2, the non-climate-change-related component of 
mortality from hunger, malaria, and coastal flooding ranges from 4.4 million in 990 
to 2.–6.0 million in 2085 (depending on the scenario). Moreover, due to the inertia 
of the climate system, mitigation would not reduce even the small climate change 
component of the problem significantly until a few decades have elapsed.
Mitigation has the additional problem that it indiscriminately reduces all impacts 
of climate change – whether positive or negative – as illustrated by the negative 
effect of mitigation on the global PAR for water stress and on habitat converted 
to human needs (see Figures 5 and 6, and Table 2). Adaptation can, however, se-
lectively capture the benefits of climate change while reducing its costs. And whi-
le the impacts of global warming are uncertain, there is no doubt that malaria, 
hunger, water stress, and coastal flooding are real and urgent problems here and 
now. Thus, compared to mitigation, focused adaptation can deliver benefits that 
are larger, with greater certainty, and much sooner.
Significantly, work on focused adaptation measures can commence, and in some 
areas has already begun, without detailed knowledge of the impacts of climate 
change. Cases in point are the development of malaria vaccines, transferable pro-
perty rights for water resources, development of early warning systems for climate-
sensitive events ranging from storms to potential epidemics of various kinds, and 
elucidation of mechanisms that confer resistance in crops to drought, water log-
ging, or saline soils (Goklany 2007b, 2007c). To the extent that such measures do 
not rely on the location-specific details of inherently uncertain impacts analyses, 
focused adaptation reduces the risk of having wasted resources by pouring them 
into problems that may or may not occur at specific locations (Goklany 995).
Ancillary benefits (also called “co-benefits”) of adaptation focused on reducing 
vulnerability to malaria and hunger include better health, increased economic 
growth, and greater human capital, which should advance human well-being and 
the capacity to address a much wider variety of problems (Goklany 2000; UNMP 
2005a). These “co-benefits,” in fact, are among the goals and purposes of sustainable 
development as articulated in the Millennium Development Goals (UNMP 2005a). 
In other words, focused adaptation to selectively reduce vulnerability to existing 
climate-sensitive problems would advance sustainable development in addition to 
explicitly laying the foundations for adapting to future climate change. 
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Finally, the conclusion that focused adaptation is for the foreseeable future supe-
rior in terms of both global benefits and global costs is independent of any choice 
of discount rates. That is because the benefits of focused adaptation will general-
ly follow relatively soon after costs are incurred. But the climate system’s inertia 
ensures that the costs of emission reductions will have to be borne for decades 
before any benefits accrue.
The following provides examples of focused adaptation, and associated costs.
Malaria 
The UN Millennium Project (2005b) reports that the global death toll from malaria 
could be reduced by 75 percent by 205 from the 2005 baseline at an annual cost 
of $3 billion. Adaptations focused on reducing current vulnerabilities to malaria 
include measures targeted specifically at malaria as well as measures that would 
generally enhance the capacity to respond to public health problems and deliver 
public health services more effectively and efficiently. Malaria-specific measures 
include indoor residual (home) spraying with insecticides such as DDT, insectici-
de-treated bed nets, improved case management, more comprehensive antenatal 
care, and development of safe, effective, and cheap vaccines and therapies (UNMP 
2005b; WHO 999). 
I will assume below – based on the ratio of estimated deaths in 2085 to that in 
990 under the A2 scenario (the worst scenario for malaria) and rounding up to the 
nearest whole number – that expenditures should be tripled (see Goklany 2007a, 
Table ), regardless of the emission scenario, in order to reduce malaria deaths by 
75 percent. 
Hunger 
An additional $5 billion annual investment in agricultural R&D – 5 percent of 
global agricultural R&D funding during the 990s – should raise productivity suf-
ficiently to more than compensate for the annual shortfall in productivity pro-
jected to be caused by climate change under the worst scenario (estimated at 0.02 
percent from  Parry et al. 2004). That should more than eliminate any increase in 
hunger (and related mortality) due to climate change – particularly if the additio-
nal investment is targeted toward solving developing countries’ current food and 
agricultural problems that might be exacerbated by warming.
An alternative cost estimate can be derived from the UN Millennium Project (2005a, 
2005c: 8), which estimates that 5–8 percent of the extra funding for MDGs would 
be needed to realize the MDG for hunger, namely, reducing global hunger 50 per-
cent by 205. This is equivalent to $2 billion in 200 to $5 billion in 205. In 
the following I will assume $5 billion annually for 200–205.
Current agricultural problems that could be exacerbated by warming and should 
be the focus of vulnerability-reduction measures include growing crops in poor 
climatic or soil conditions (e.g., low-soil moisture in some areas, too much water 
in others, or soils with high salinity, alkalinity, or acidity). Because of warming, 
such conditions could become more prevalent, agriculture might have to expand 
into areas with poorer soils, or both. Actions focused on increasing agricultural 
productivity under current marginal conditions would alleviate hunger in the fu-
ture whether or not the climate changes. Significant efforts are already underway 
along these lines (e.g., Ligi and Kaskey 2007). 
Given the uncertainties associated with location-specific impacts of climate 
change, particularly impacts dependent on precipitation (which is much harder to 
project than temperature), prudence dictates that adaptation measures should be 
relatively insensitive to location-specific details of impacts estimates (and GCM 
results).  For example, since both CO2 and temperatures will likely increase despite 
uncertainties on the details, crop varieties should be developed to take advantage 
of such conditions (Goklany 2007b, 2007c). Progress on these approaches does 
not have to depend on improving our skill in forecasting location-specific details 
of climate change and its impacts. These focused adaptation measures should be 
complemented by development of higher-yield, lower-impact crop varieties and 
improved agronomic practices so that more food is produced per unit of land and/
or water diverted to agriculture. In addition to reducing hunger, that would bene-
fit terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity, and sustainable development (Goklany 
2007b, 2007c).
Coastal Flooding 
IPCC (2007: Figure 6.0, based on Tol 2007b) indicates that the annual cost of pro-
tecting against a sea level rise of about 0.66 meters in 200 – equivalent to about 
0.52 meters in 2085 compared with 0.34 meters under the warmest (AFI) sce-
nario – would vary from $2.6 to $0 billion during the 2st century. I will assume 
$0 billion for the purposes of this paper. Governments could, moreover, discou-
rage maladaptation by not subsidizing insurance and/or protective measures that 
allow individuals to offload private risks to the broader public, which might also 
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lead to more thoughtful consideration (or reconsideration) of capital investments 
in vulnerable areas.
Water Stress 
Although, as Figure 5 shows, climate change could relieve water stress, several 
measures are available to help societies cope with present and future water stress 
regardless of their cause. They include institutional reforms to treat water as an 
economic commodity by allowing market pricing and transferable property rights 
to water. Such reforms should stimulate broader adoption of existing but underused 
conservation technologies and lead to more private-sector investment in research 
and development, which would reduce water demand by all sectors. For example, 
new or improved crops and techniques for more efficient use of agricultural water 
would enhance agricultural productivity and reduce the risk of hunger, pressures 
on freshwater biodiversity, and increase opportunities for other in-stream uses 
(e.g., recreation). 
Improvements in water conservation following such reforms are likely to be most 
pronounced for the agricultural sector, which is responsible for 85 percent of global 
water consumption and is the single largest current threat to freshwater biodiversi-
ty. A reduction of 8 percent in agricultural water consumption would, on average, 
double the amount of water available for all other uses (Goklany 2005).
Conservation of Species and Biodiversity
Some perceive that adaptation is unsuitable for addressing climate change impacts 
on natural systems (IPCC 200a; Wilbanks et al. 2003) because they tend to view 
climate change in isolation from others pressures on such systems. But consider that 
conversion of land and water to agricultural uses is the greatest threat to terrestri-
al and freshwater biodiversity, respectively (Goklany 2007c). Thus, increasing the 
productivity and efficiency of agricultural land and water use would reduce these 
critical threats to biodiversity (Goklany 995, Green et al. 2005). Accordingly, the 
focused adaptation measures outlined above to address hunger and water stress 
would, in addition to reducing those specific problems, also provide “co-benefits” by 
reducing pressures on species and biodiversity. Other measures could also include 
the establishment of gene banks (Wilbanks et al. 2003), measures to preserve and 
propagate endangered or threatened species through modern biological techniques 
(Estabrook 2002; Lanza et al. 2000), and techniques based on restoration biolo-
gy, or adaptive management of disturbance regimes such as fires to help mediate 
transitions from one ecosystem regime to another as environmental conditions 
change (Goklany 2007c).
4.2 Sustainable Economic Development: A Third Approach
So far I have examined two approaches to address warming through the foresee-
able future. The first, mitigation, would reduce impacts – positive and negative 
– across the board. That approach entails significant near-term costs, whereas any 
payoff will be delayed far into the future. The second approach, focused adaptati-
on, would reduce vulnerability to climate-sensitive effects now and through 2085 
by focusing simultaneously on individual threats.
However, developing countries are most at risk of climate change not because they 
will experience greater climate change, but because they lack adaptive capacity to 
cope with its impacts. Hence, another approach to addressing climate change would 
be to enhance the adaptive capacity of developing countries by promoting broad 
development, i.e., economic development and human capital formation, which, of 
course, is the point of sustainable economic development. Moreover, since deter-
minants of adaptive and mitigative capacity are largely the same, enhancing the 
former should boost the latter. Perhaps more important, advancing economic deve-
lopment and human capital formation would advance society’s ability to cope with 
all manner of threats, whether climate related or not (Goklany 995, 2007c).
The costs and benefits of sustainable economic development can be garnished from 
literature on the MDGs, which were devised to promote sustainable development 
in developing countries. The benefits associated with these goals – halving global 
poverty; halving hunger, halving the lack of access to safe water and sanitation; 
reducing child and maternal mortality by 66 percent or more; providing universal 
primary education; and reversing growth in malaria, AIDS/HIV, and other major 
diseases – would exceed the benefits flowing from the deepest mitigation (see Ta-
ble 2). Yet the additional annual cost to the richest countries of attaining the MDGs 
by 205 is estimated at 0.5 percent of their GDP (UNMP 2005a), approximately the 
same as that of the ineffectual Kyoto Protocol.
Since focused adaptation would only reduce climate-sensitive barriers to sustaina-
ble economic development (e.g., malaria, hunger, water stress) without necessarily 
addressing other significant problems (e.g., access to safe water and sanitation, 
illiteracy, child and maternal mortality), broad pursuit of sustainable economic de-
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velopment would deliver greater benefits but might cost more, although arguably 
economic development pays for itself in the long run.
4.3 Mitigation versus Adaptation
Table 3 compares for the AFI (warmest-but-richest) and the A2 (poorest) emissi-
on scenarios, costs and benefits of two mitigation scenarios – the Kyoto Protocol 
and freezing climate change at 990 levels – against two adaptation scenarios, 
namely, focused adaptation and sustainable economic development. This table 
provides benefits in terms of
• declines in mortality from hunger, malaria, and coastal flooding,
• changes in net PAR of water stress, 
• progress toward the MDGs, and 
• habitat lost to cropland. 
This table shows that focused adaptation would deliver far greater benefits than 
would even rolling back climate change to 990 levels but at one-fifth the cost of 
the ineffectual Kyoto Protocol ($34 billion annually versus $65 billion for 200-
205), whereas broad development would provide even greater benefits at the 
same cost as the Protocol.
Given the sorry track record of external aid over the past decades – particularly 
where institutions to bolster economic development, human capital, and techno-
logical change are weak and governance is poor – several analysts are skeptical 
that external aid can ensure sustainable economic development (e.g., Easterly 
2006). They correctly note, sustainable economic development can rarely, if ever, 
be imposed or purchased from outside. The necessary institutional changes have 
to come from within. Nevertheless, according to Table 3, even if the UNMP’s target 
goals are met only at the 20 percent level for whatever reason (e.g., corruption, 
rosy cost estimates generated by UNMP, overconfidence in success, unforeseen 
circumstances) the residual benefits would exceed what can be obtained through 
mitigation, at least through the foreseeable future, and probably at lower cost. 
And this argument ignores the possibility that mitigation projects themselves can 
be subject to waste, fraud and abuse.
Notably, climate change would cause 0.–0.3 million deaths annually by 2085 from 
hunger, malaria and flooding (see Figure 4), but lesser amounts in the interim. This is 
dwarfed by the toll due to non-climate-change-related factors, which could range 
from 4.4 million in 990 to 2.0–6.0 million in 2085. The difference in cumulative 
mortality from 990–2085 between the adaptation and mitigation options is in 
the range of all deaths worldwide in wars, genocide, and other atrocities during 
the 20th century, which Leitenberg (2006) estimates at 23 million people. 
Thus, consideration of cumulative reductions provides further support for the ad-
aptive approaches, because they would provide a steady and significant stream 
of benefits starting in the very near term, whereas benefits of mitigation are con-
demned to be relatively insignificant for decades (due to the inertia of the climate 
system).
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. MANAGING CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF MORE URGENT PROBLEMS
It has sometimes been argued that fairness demands that present generations 
expend resources on mitigation now, instead of leaving future generations with 
a bigger mess and a larger clean-up bill. But as the data presented thus far clear-
ly demonstrates, their well-being would be enhanced by a greater amount, more 
surely and more rapidly through focused adaptation, sustainable development, or 
both – not by mitigation.
The above analyses indicates that policies to address climate change in the near-
to-medium term should eschew direct GHG controls that go beyond “no-regret” 
policies, that is, policies that would entail no net costs. Instead, policymakers should 
work to enhance adaptation and promote economic development.
First, policymakers should work toward increasing adaptive capacity, particularly 
in developing countries, by promoting efforts to reduce vulnerability to today’s 
urgent climate-sensitive problems—malaria, hunger, water stress, flooding, and 
other extreme events – that might be exacerbated by climate change (Goklany 
995, 2005). The technologies, human capital, and institutions that will need to 
be strengthened or developed to accomplish this will also be critical in addres-
sing these very problems in the future if and when they are aggravated by climate 
change. Increasing adaptive capacity might also increase the level at which GHG 
concentration would need to be stabilized to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system” – the stated “ultimate objective” of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Alternatively, increasing adaptive ca-
pacity could postpone the deadline for stabilization, which would allow societies 
additional time to acquire wealth to better afford costly mitigation technologies, 
and to invest in both existing and new technologies so that the present value of 
 Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) specifies that its 
“ultimate objective… is to achieve… stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the at-
mosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems 
to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” See: United Nations, United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate, >http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.
pdf.<
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the future cost of emission controls is reduced. Either way, it could reduce the costs 
of meeting the ultimate objective. 
Second, policymakers should strengthen or develop the institutions necessary to 
advance and/or reduce barriers to economic growth, human capital and the pro-
pensity for technological change. Doing so would improve both adaptive and miti-
gative capacities, as well as the prospects for sustainable development. (Goklany 
995, 2000, 2005).
Third, policymakers should implement no-regret mitigation measures now while, 
fourth, expanding the range and diversity of future no-regret (i.e., no-cost) options. 
The latter could be advanced by research and development to improve existing – and 
develop new – technologies that would reduce GHGs more cost-effectively than 
currently possible. This would reduce the costs of future emission reductions, even if 
they have to be deeper to compensate for a delay in more aggressive responses. 
Fifth, policymakers should allow the market to dictate which no-regret options 
should be implemented where. Among other things, that implies reducing direct 
or indirect subsidies to increase energy use, land clearance, coastal development, 
and other activities that contribute to greater GHG emissions or climate change 
damages. OECD nations should also reduce, if not eliminate, agricultural subsidies 
and barriers to trade. They are expensive for consumers in OECD nations, and they 
damage the economies and well-being of many developing nations whose econo-
mies are dominated by the agricultural sector, which then reduces their adaptive 
capacity (Goklany 995, 2007c).
Sixth, understanding of the science, impacts, and policies of climate change should 
be advanced in order to develop more effective response strategies to forestall 
“dangerous” impacts of climate change should they become imminent (per Arti-
cle 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) while simultaneously 
advancing human well-being.
Seventh, the impacts of climate change and, apropos of the unintended conse-
quences of subsidized biofuel production for example, climate change policies (Son-
ja Boehmer-Christiansen, personal communication) should be monitored to give 
advance warning of “dangerous” impacts and, if necessary, to rearrange priorities 
should the adverse impacts on human and environmental well-being occur faster, 
or threaten to be more severe or more likely than currently projected. 
Together, these policies constitute an adaptive management approach to addressing 
climate change that would help solve today’s urgent problems while bolstering our 
ability to address tomorrow’s climate change challenge.
6. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding any climate change, our descendants will be much better off than 
we are at least through 2200. Through 2200, human well-being is likely to be high-
est under the richest-but-warmest (AFI) scenario and lowest for the poorest (A2) 
scenario. Matters may be best in the AFI world for some critical environmental 
indicators through 200, but not necessarily for others. 
The well-being of future inhabitants in today’s developing world would, even in 
the absence of any mitigation, exceed that of the inhabitants of today’s industri-
alized world under all but the poorest scenario. Future generations should, more-
over, have greater access to human capital and technology to address whatever 
problems they might face, including climate change. Hence the argument that we 
should shift resources from dealing with the real and urgent problems confronting 
present generations to solving potential problems of tomorrow’s wealthier and 
more technologically advanced generations is unpersuasive at best, and verges on 
immoral at worst.
Equally important, climate change is not now – nor is it likely to be for the foresee-
able future – the most important environmental problem facing the globe, unless 
present-day problems such as hunger, water-related diseases, lack of access to safe 
water and sanitation, and indoor air pollution are reduced drastically. Otherwise, 
with respect to human well-being, climate change will continue to be outranked 
by these other problems and, with respect to environmental well-being, by habitat 
loss and other threats to biodiversity.
Either focused adaptation or broad pursuit of sustainable development would pro-
vide far greater benefits than even the deepest mitigation – and at no greater cost 
than that of the barely-effective Kyoto Protocol. 
Moreover, resources expended on solving today’s climate-sensitive problems and 
advancing sustainable economic development will build human capital, advance 
technology, and enhance the adaptive and mitigative capacities of future genera-
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tions.  Consider that current generations are the beneficiaries of a host of techno-
logical advances that previous generations devised primarily to solve the urgent 
problems that plagued them, e.g., cholera, unsafe water, pasteurization, vaccina-
tions, malaria, hunger, electricity, and so forth. Without these technologies, cur-
rent generations would have had to invent them, and our well-being would have 
been that much lower. By the same token, helping current generations will also 
help future generations.
If one believes that industrialized countries have a moral and ethical obligation to 
deal with climate change, this obligation cannot, and should not, be met through 
aggressive emission reductions at this time – “cannot” because the planet is already 
committed to some climate change – and “should not” because the threats that 
climate change would exacerbate can be reduced more effectively and economi-
cally through focused efforts to reduce vulnerability or through broader efforts to 
advance economic development. Any such obligation is best discharged through 
efforts to reduce present-day vulnerabilities to climate-sensitive problems that are 
urgent and could be exacerbated by climate change.
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